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BEARD & UBER-BEARD 
Mark A. Graber* 
Once upon a time, respectable scholars thought lead could be 
converted into gold, worried that educating woman harmed their 
offspring, and maintained that the purpose of the Constitution of 
the United States was to enrich the framers. A conference 
marking the anniversary of the publication of such works as Le 
Livre des figures hieroglyphiques1 or Sex in Education2 would 
spend considerable time explaining why previous generations 
were foolish. The thesis of Charles Beard’s An Economic 
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States presently 
enjoys approximately the same status as alchemy and medical 
misogyny. “Today,” Richard Hofstadter wrote in 1968, “Beard’s 
reputation stands like an imposing ruin in the landscape of 
American historiography.”3 Gordon Wood states, “Beard’s 
notion that men’s property holdings . . . determined their ideas 
and their behavior was so crude that no further time should be 
spent on it.”4 The question of the day is whether Beard and An 
Economic Interpretation are worth studying for reasons other 
than historic interest. 
The overriding conclusion of the symposium is that Charles 
Beard lives in contemporary scholarship in ways that Nicolas 
Flamel and Edward H. Clarke do not. Some commentators 
celebrate the continued vitality of An Economic Interpretation of 
the Constitution. They recognize that Beard was wrong on many 
specifics, but insist that Beard’s emphasis on economic interests 
provides a foundation for scholarship that uncovers deeper truths 
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about American constitutional development and contemporary 
American constitutional politics. Still others regret what they 
perceive to be the continued vitality of Beardian themes in 
contemporary constitutional scholarship. In their view, 
contemporary scholars miss or mischaracterize distinctive 
features of American constitutional law and politics by remaining 
too harnessed to Beard’s economic determinism. 
The papers below highlight how over the past half century 
the debate over An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution 
has been transformed from a controversy over Beard to a 
controversy over “uber-Beard.” Beard was an historian who 
claimed in An Economic Interpretation that elite economic self-
interest explained the movement for the Constitution of the 
United States, the distinctive features of the Constitution of the 
United States, and why the Constitution of the United States was 
ratified.5 Beard’s later works relied on a similar economic analysis 
to explain numerous episodes in American constitutional 
development.6 Uber-Beard refers to those Progressive and New 
Deal scholars who regard various economic interests as the 
central force in American constitutional development. The 
scholars who celebrate uber-Beard do so because they believe this 
focus on interests garners important descriptive insights into and 
has valuable normative consequences for American 
constitutional development. Those who worry about the 
continued influence of uber-Beard are less pleased with the 
impact of progressive-style social science research, insisting that 
the over-emphasis on interests unduly discounts the independent 
influence of ideas on American constitutional development in 
general and on the particular ways ideas structure those interests 
that Beard and other scholars thought were the prime movers of 
constitutional politics. 
For most of the twentieth century, historians disputed 
whether Beard correctly identified the political movements that 
contested the Constitution in the late 1780s and the motives 
participants in that struggle had for supporting or opposing 
ratification. Beard insisted that economic elites structured debate 
during the framing and ratification conventions. An Economic 
Interpretation concluded, 
 5. See notes 7, 11–13, 14–17, 19 infra, and the relevant text. 
 6. See CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1944).  
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The movement for the Constitution of the United States was 
originated and carried through principally by four groups of 
personality interests which had been adversely affected under 
the Articles of Confederation: money, public securities, 
manufactures, and trade and shipping. 
. . . . 
The members of the Philadelphia Convention which drafted 
the Constitution were, with a few exceptions, immediately, 
directly, and personally interested in, and derived economic 
advantages from, the establishment of the new system.7 
By the late 1960s, a strong scholarly consensus developed 
that Beard was mistaken in his class analysis of the founding era. 
Robert E. Brown raised sharp questions about Beard’s empirical 
methods.8 Forrest McDonald’s survey of nearly two thousand 
framers “found that the differences in the[] property holdings” of 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists “were negligible.”9 Debate 
continues over whether some measure of economic status 
explains the difference between late eighteenth-century 
proponents and opponents of the Constitution.10 Nevertheless, no 
contemporary scholar claims that Beard in 1913 correctly mapped 
the lines of conflict. 
Beard remains vital because his social scientific approach to 
constitutional history and the ways in which he sought to 
demystify the framing have numerous contemporary champions 
and critics. Beard was a committed “economic determinis[t]”11 
who believed that political and constitutional developments were 
structured by fights over property. An Economic Interpretation 
contended, “class and group divisions based on property lie at the 
basis of modern government; and politics and constitutional law 
are inevitably a reflex of these contending interests.”12 Ideas and 
ideologies, in Beard’s view, were rooted in class position and were 
not independent casual influences on human behavior or political 
development. He criticized previous constitutional histories for 
 7. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 324 (The Free Press 1986) (1913). 
 8. ROBERT E. BROWN, CHARLES BEARD AND THE CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF “AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION” (1956). 
 9. Forrest McDonald, Introduction to BEARD, supra note 7, at xxx. See also 
FORREST MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1958). 
 10. See ROBERT A. MCGUIRE, TO FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION: A NEW 
ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2003). 
 11. BEARD, supra note 7, at 5. 
 12. Id. at 16.  
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“[t]he absence of any consideration of the social and economic 
elements determining the thought of the [framers].”13 Beard 
believed this hard-headed approach to constitutional history 
knocked the framers off their nineteenth-century pedestals and 
onto ordinary political terrains. In sharp contrast to some 
previous histories that saw James Madison and friends as working 
out the divine will,14 Beard insisted that proponents of the 
Constitution were part of a political movement that was no 
different in kind or motivation than any other political movement 
that sought to influence American constitutional development. 
He wrote, “The Constitution was of human origin, immediately at 
least, and it is now discussed and applied by human beings who 
find themselves engaged in certain callings, occupations, 
professions, and interests.”15 While Beard claimed this 
observation packed no political punch,16 the bottom-line message 
of An Economic Interpretation was that contemporary 
progressives should imitate the framers by interpreting the 
Constitution in light of the policies that they thought best served 
their interests rather than imitate the framers by interpreting the 
Constitution as adopting the policies the framers thought best 
served the framers’ interests. The 1935 edition of An Economic 
Interpretation concluded, 
It is for us, recipients of their heritage, to inquire constantly and 
persistently, when theories of national power or states’ rights 
are propounded: “What interests are behind them and to 
whose advantage will changes or the maintenance of old forms 
accrue?” By refusing to do this we become victims of history—
clay in the hands of its makers.17 
The An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution that 
remains controversial was the first prominent work that studied 
the Constitution of the United States by employing or purporting 
to employ modern social science methods. Constitutional studies 
before Beard tended to be hagiographic and focused on the 
timeless ideas the author believed motivated the framers. George 
Bancroft, the most influential constitutional historian of the 
nineteenth century, interpreted the framing in light of “the 
movement of the divine power which gives unity to the universe, 
 13. Id. at 9. 
 14. See note 18 infra, and the relevant text. 
 15. BEARD, supra note 7, at l. 
 16. Id. at xlii. 
 17. Id. at liii.  
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and order and connection to events.”18 Beard anticipated much 
political science scholarship of the post-World War II era by 
emphasizing how constitutional forms and practices were more 
often consequences of interest group politics than the theoretical 
ruminations of “straight-thinking” men.19 By focusing on the 
Constitution’s origins as a means to satisfy particular late 
eighteenth-century interests, Beard opened the door to reflection 
on whether the Constitution ought to be reformed in light of 
present interests.20 
Contemporary reactions to Beard and An Economic 
Interpretation of the Constitution are rooted in reactions to the 
ways in which social scientists began to treat the Constitution and 
American constitutional development during the Progressive Era. 
Many papers in this symposium are uber-Beardian, even as they 
question Beard’s particular thesis. These essays insist the hunt for 
the interests that structured the Constitution remains vital. That 
search, the authors claim, reveals important insights into 
American constitutional development that may influence 
contemporary theories about the authority and proper 
interpretation of the Constitution. Other papers in this 
symposium question both Beard and uber-Beard. These essays 
contend that Beard and his contemporaries led social scientists 
and their legal allies down mistaken paths that continue to distort 
research on the American constitutional experience. Beard still 
lives, each essay makes clear, though whether continued 
resurrection or reinterment is the appropriate response remains 
contested. 
I. THE MAKING OF BEARD AND UBER-BEARD 
Richard Drake, Ajay Mehrotra, and G. Edward White place 
Beard and uber-Beard in their historical contexts. Each locates 
Beard’s work at the birth of twentieth-century social science. 
Drake looks at the English roots of Beard’s approach to history. 
Mehrotra examines how Beard was shaped by and shaped the first 
 18. GEORGE BANCROFT, 6 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FROM 
THE DISCOVERY OF THE CONTINENT 414 (1892). 
 19. BEARD supra note 7, at xliii. The classical mid-twentieth century works on 
interest group pluralism include ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND 
POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL 
PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (1951). 
 20. See especially SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: 
WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT 
IT) (2006).  
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modern social science departments at Columbia University. 
White details Beard’s influence on Progressive and New Deal 
social science analysis of American constitutional development. 
Beard’s work, each essay assumes, was not sui generis, but a 
product of a series of intellectual forces that held sway over the 
academy in the United States and England long after the specific 
conclusions of An Economic Interpretation were discredited. 
Professor Drake focuses on two developments in the British 
academy at the turn of the twentieth century that structured 
Beard’s scholarship. The first, which Beard absorbed through 
reading the art critic John Ruskin, was the practice of tying 
scholarship on political economy and political culture to political 
reform. “Beard,” Drake notes, “found in Ruskin . . . not only a 
compelling interpretation of modern social problems, but also a 
call to action.”21 The second was an emphasis on class as an 
important factor in historical development and political practice. 
Beard first became an economic determinist, Drake details, when 
he was exposed to the influence of British anti-imperialist 
scholars. The Charles Beard who arrived in England as a young 
scholar was a jingoist who favored the United States taking up 
what Rudyard Kipling called the “white man’s burden.”22 After 
reading the works of John Atkinson Hobson, Beard turned his 
analytic eye from race to economic class as the prime historical 
mover. Inspired by Hobson’s analysis of the role big business 
played in English imperialism, Drake notes, Beard developed “his 
skepticism about the pretensions of the capitalist status quo” that 
“propelled him along the path he took as a historian.”23 An 
Economic Interpretation would be to previous constitutional 
scholarship what Hopson’s work on imperialism was to Beard’s 
previous work on turn-of-the-twentieth-century American 
expansionism. 
Professor Mehrotra discusses the American influences on 
Beard. His essay emphasizes how An Economic Interpretation 
was structured by the founders of modern social science research 
who found disciplinary homes at Columbia University during the 
first decades of the twentieth century. Mehrotra declares, “Beard 
was the product of a unique Columbia tradition of inductive, 
proto-institutionalist research in political economy—a tradition 
 21. Richard Drake, Charles Beard & the English Historians, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 
313, 314 (2014). 
 22. RUDYARD KIPLING, The White Man’s Burden, in POEMS 96 (Peter Washington, 
ed., 2007). 
 23. Drake, supra note 21, at 321.  
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that at its core sought to meld serious political and historical 
scholarship with progressive social activism.”24 Beard was joined 
in this effort to map the material foundations of political 
development by such luminaries as Thomas Reed Powell, Frank 
Goodnow, William Ogburn, Franklin Henry Giddings, and John 
Dewey. These Columbia faculty, Mehrotra notes, were united by 
a common desire “to replace the dry and arid formalistic ideas and 
theories of an earlier generation of amateur academics with 
inductive, empirical knowledge about the realities of lived social 
experience.”25 Such empirical investigations, these Columbians 
further maintained, replaced philosophy with economics as the 
prime mover of political life. Mehrotra points out that throughout 
his life “Beard acknowledged his debts to [Edwin] Seligman,” a 
prominent economist at Columbia, and Seligman’s “‘nearly 
axiomatic’ theory that ‘the economic life is . . . the fundamental 
condition of all life.’”26 
Professor White devotes his essay to uber-Beard. He finds in 
Beard certain basic themes that resonated throughout the 
progressive histories of the next half-century and remain vital 
today. White begins with the common observation that Beard 
inspired several generations of scholars to emphasize the material 
determinates of political and constitutional development. Beard 
and his followers, White points out, characterized “American 
history, including American legal history, as an ongoing clash 
between antagonistic ‘classes’ and ‘interests,’ with ‘class’ and 
‘interest’ being conceived of in economic terms, although 
reflected in social and political alignments.”27 This economic 
determinism was grounded in what White describes as 
“relentlessly modernist” history.28 Such history takes for granted 
the human capacity to change the social world for the better. 
White states, “practitioners presuppose[] that the principal causal 
agents in history were human beings holding power and exercising 
their will.”29 Liberal political principles and commitments to the 
rule of law are epiphenomenal in this world view. Such norms are 
derived from interests, not ideals that cabin preference seeking. 
 24. Ajay K. Mehrotra, Charles A. Beard & the Columbia School of Political 
Economy: Revisiting the Intellectual Roots of the Beardian Thesis, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 
475, 477 (2014). 
 25. Id. at 488. 
 26. Id. at 503. 
 27. G. Edward White, Charles Beard & Progressive Legal Historiography, 29 CONST. 
COMMENT. 349, 354 (2014). 
 28. Id. at 357. 
 29. Id.  
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“[S]ince neither law nor any other putative causal agencies in the 
universe operated independently of human will,” White states, 
Beard and his progressive academic progeny held that “legal 
history was best understood as a series of episodes in which 
human actors reacted to their social experiences by creating laws 
and policies designed to further their ‘interests’ as they currently 
understood them.”30 Human progress was the one matter White’s 
progressive historians thought out of human control. White 
regards Beard and his followers as “enthusiasts for leveling.”31 
That enthusiasm, in turn, encouraged a progressive tendency to 
write Whig history. Progressive scholarship, White insisted, was 
motived by the desire to bring “the true motives of official 
decision makers to light and remind[] . . . readers that, in the end, 
those officials’ goals would be thwarted by the inevitabilities of 
history.”32 
II. INTERESTS AND IDEAS (AND FUNCTIONALISM) IN 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Many essays in this symposium discuss or at least touch on 
Beard’s insistence that economic interests have a far greater 
impact on political and constitutional development than 
philosophical ideals. White and Stephen Feldman claim that uber-
Beardians fail to understand the normative foundations of the 
Constitution of the United States. “Far from embracing a 
‘progressive’ vision of history and human agency as a causal force 
driving historical change,” White writes, the framers “feared the 
unlimited exercise of official power as leading to corruption and 
tyranny.”33 “[C]ontrary to Beard’s assertions,” Feldman writes, 
“the framers also genuinely believed in the virtuous pursuit of the 
common good.”34 Jonathan Gienapp insists historians should 
discard the sharp uber-Beardian distinction between interests and 
ideas. Bartholomew Sparrow, Shannon Bow O’Brien and Mary 
Anne Case are more uber-Beardian. Sparrow and O’Brien do a 
Beardian analysis of how the presence of a propertyless class of 
Americans influenced the framing. Case discusses the 
constitutional consequences of the economic interest eighteenth-
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 363. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 365. 
 34. Stephen M. Feldman, The Interpretation of Constitutional History, or Charles 
Beard Becomes a Fortuneteller (with an Emphasis on Free Expression), 29 CONST. 
COMMENT. 323, 333 (2014).  
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century men had in maintaining their economic control over 
women. Michael Caires suggests that a more functionalist analysis 
better explains crucial episodes in American constitutional 
development than either an uber-Beardian focus on elite interests 
or an anti-uber-Beardian focus on political principles. 
Professor Gienapp criticizes the uber-Beardian tendency to 
discuss interests divorced from the conceptional frameworks in 
which political actors conceptualize and speak about their desired 
ends. Beard thought of himself as an empiricist. Gienapp, 
however, claims that the author of An Economic Interpretation 
was as much in the grip of transcendent ideas about the causes of 
political behavior as the historians Beard scorned were in the grip 
of transcendent ideas about political right. Gienapp states, “Beard 
was an avowed universalist who believed that timeless material 
interest explained human behavior no matter differences across 
space or through time.”35 Beard’s consistent assertions that 
interests were prior to ideas and were the causes of the ideas 
humans expressed was an unfortunate consequence of this 
economic determinism. What Beard forgot, Gienapp claims, is 
that “neither principles nor interests exist independently of the 
perceptual mode that accounts for them.”36 What people want and 
think is largely determined by the vocabulary in which they can 
both conceptualize and express their interests and ideas. The 
persons responsible for the Constitution could articulate only 
those interests that eighteenth-century republican and liberal 
theory claimed governments ought to satisfy. Gienapp writes,  
Even if we assumed that the American framers were hopelessly 
self-interested, it would still be our primary task to reconstitute 
the conceptual vocabularies that animated them, since those 
would be necessary to grasp how they gave the world meaning, 
an understanding from which alone we could make sense of 
their behavior, behavior which notably involved constructing 
the United States’ Federal Constitution.37 
Gienapp nevertheless finds in Beard’s writings an escape 
route from the false uber-Beardian ideas-interests dichotomy. 
Beard emphasized that he was merely following Madisonian 
understandings of political science.38 Gienapp details how that 
 35. Jonathan Gienapp, Using Beard to Overcome Beardianism: Charles Beard’s 
Forgotten Historicism and the Ideas-Interests Dichotomy, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 367, 370 
(2014). 
 36. Id. at 372. 
 37. Id. at 373. 
 38. BEARD, supra note 7, at 156.  
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political science was rooted in ideas distinctive to the 
Enlightenment about how the division of property in a society 
structured political regimes. When designing constitutional 
institutions, Madison and his contemporaries adjusted those 
inherited beliefs to accommodate the more complex forms of 
property that emerged in the late eighteenth century. “Beard’s 
great insight,” Gienapp concludes, “was that Madison’s own 
political science better explained the character of the Constitution 
than anything else Madison or any of the other delegates declared 
or sought.”39 That political science, unique to the late eighteenth 
century, was based on neither timeless political truths nor on the 
material interests of those who framed the Constitution. 
Professor Sparrow and Professor O’Brien are more 
enthusiastic proponents of an economic interpretation of the 
Constitution of the United States. Their essay claims to be more 
uber-Beardian than Beard. “[T]he defect in Beard’s thesis,” 
Sparrow and O’Brien declare, “may be the opposite from that 
voiced by his critics: it is not that Beard overplays his hand, but 
that he understates his case.”40 Beard told the story of how during 
the framing and ratification of the Constitution the interests of 
persons with more property triumphed over the interests of 
persons with less property. Sparrow and O’Brien insist that we 
look as carefully at how the existence of persons with no property 
shaped the Constitution of the United States. Their essay 
documents that such persons were a substantial portion of the 
population when the Constitution was ratified.41 They detail “the 
role of this class in the founding and how the presence of this class 
influenced the text of the Constitution and other founding 
documents.” 42 This influence ranged from the “first grievance 
against the British government in the Declaration of 
Independence,” 43 which referred to royal vetoes of colonial laws 
forbidding the importation of felons from England to “the 
(misnamed) Fugitive Slave Clause,” which “applied to indentured 
servants and felons,”44 to the framers’ willingness to rely on state 
constitutions, which “disenfranchised and discriminated against 
 39. Gienapp, supra note 35, at 380. 
 40. Bartholomew Sparrow & Shannon Bow O’Brien, Pulling Punches: Charles 
Beard, the Propertyless, and the Founding of the United States, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 409, 
410 (2014). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 412. 
 43. Id. at 418. 
 44. Id. at 420.  
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poor whites.”45 Sparrow and Beard explain that propertyless 
persons were not simply individuals who shared a common trait, 
but over time became a class with a politically potent identity. 
They point out that “this class acquired a shared consciousness. 
Not one of a working class identity . . . but one of racial 
supremacy.”46 Beard said very little about race, largely missing the 
enormous impact the substitution of racial identify for class 
identity had on colonial political development and the 
constitutional politics of antebellum America.47 
Professor Case extends the Sparrow/O’Brien concern with 
the incompleteness of Beard’s class analysis to gender. Her paper 
discusses Beard’s failure, in Abigail Adams’s words, to 
“remember the ladies.”48 Beard’s lack of interest in male 
supremacy was an economic as well as a social and cultural 
omission. Case declares, Beard “did not consider in any detail the 
possible influence of their personal experience as members of the 
distinct group of males who had an economic interest, through the 
laws of coverture, in the labor and property of the women in their 
families.”49 She points out that because many framers derived 
their fortunes from the women in their family, their male 
constitution permitted men to control property they did not earn. 
This material interest alone gave “these framers a direct personal 
incentive to ‘insist upon retaining an absolute power over Wives’ 
and their property.”50 By not disturbing the balance of power in 
the family, the Constitution of the United States permitted men 
to maintain control over the assets of their daughters as well as 
those of their wives.51 Nineteenth-century framers were not 
different than their grandparents, at least when men’s property 
rights were at issue. Case observes that “congressmen on all sides 
of the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment hoped that the 
amendment’s Equal Protection Clause would not be read to 
disrupt common law coverture or prohibit sex discrimination.”52 
 45. Id. at 429. 
 46. Id. at 428. 
 47. See especially EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN 
FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1975). 
 48. Mary Anne Case, The Ladies? Forget About Them. A Feminist Perspective on the 
Limits of Originalism, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 431, 435 (2014). 
 49. Id. at 431–32. 
 50. Id. at 434. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 440 (quoting Jill Hasday, Women’s Exclusion from the Constitutional 
Canon, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1715, 1719 (2013)).  
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Michael T. Caires thinks that some phenomena Beard 
analyzed are more susceptible to a functionalist analysis than to 
either an economic or a philosophic approach. Functionalists 
explain legal development “as a process of incremental, context-
specific rule development that over time works itself pure and 
allows for adaptation as the particular needs of society change.”53 
Caires’ study of the changes in the American financial system that 
took place during the Civil War highlights the differences 
between this functional emphasis on generalized social interest 
and an uber-Beardian emphasis on elite economic interests. He 
reminds readers that Beard applied his economic methods to the 
entirety of American political and constitutional development. 
When discussing the constitutional politics of the Lincoln 
Administration as well as those of the framing, Beard insisted that 
“[t]he forces of capital and industry use their power to hijack 
public institutions and realign them to create a political economy 
conducive to their interests.”54 Committed to this economic 
determinist interpretation of constitutional development, Beard 
maintained that the Legal Tender Act of 1862 and related 
measures were enacted because powerful industrialists took 
advantage of the Civil War to impose their desired policies on the 
Union.55 Caires offers an alternative history of Civil War finance 
in which the prime mover is economic need. His historical account 
claims that bank failures and looming economic catastrophe best 
explain the Legal Tender Act of 1863. “Ultimately,” Caires 
concludes, “the growth of national monetary power was an effort 
to reform and stabilize the chaotic currency system of the 
nineteenth century.”56 Neither class interests nor ideas play much 
of a role in this analysis. Although Beard claimed that bankers 
and industrialists developed monetary policy to suit their 
interests, Caires notes that their suggestions were rejected during 
the Civil War.57 His paper does not even discuss the influence of 
nineteenth-century finance theory on the participants to the 
debate over legal tender. The government of the United States 
 53. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uncertain Furture of ‘Hot News’ Misappropriation 
After Barclays Capital v. Theflyonthewall.com, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 134, 146 
(2012). For the classic expression of this position, see Omychund v. Barker, 26 Eng. Rep. 
15, 22–23 (1744) (“the common law works itself pure by rules drawn from the fountain of 
justice”). 
 54. Michael T. Caires, Rethinking the Second American Revolution: Legal Tender and 
National Banking in the Civil War Era, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 511, 512 (2014). 
 55. 2 CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN 
CIVILIZATION: THE INDUSTRIAL ERA 108 (1927). 
 56. Caires, supra note 54, at 514. 
 57. Id. at 521.  
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printed money in 1863 because printing money was the best 
political solution to the economic crisis paralyzing American 
finance in 1863. 
III. INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION OF 
ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
Four essays in this symposium discuss uber-Beardian 
understandings of judicial decisionmaking, perhaps the most 
important implicit concern of An Economic Interpretation. Beard 
in that work did not comment on theories of constitutional 
interpretation or constitutional authority, but his introduction 
allied his scholarship with the dissenting opinion of Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes in Lochner v. New York58 and such proponents 
of sociological jurisprudence as Roscoe Pound.59 In other works, 
Beard more openly allied himself with those progressives 
championing a “living constitution.” “Since most of the words and 
phrases dealing with the powers and the limits of government are 
vague and must in practice be interpreted by human beings,” he 
wrote in 1936, “it follows that the Constitution as practice is a 
living thing.”60 Saul Cornell maintains that constitutional 
interpreters who take Beard seriously cannot be originalists, at 
least as originalism is presently practiced. Case claims that 
constitutional interpreters who take seriously the absence of 
women during moments of constitutional creation should not be 
originalists. Feldman suggests that the Roberts Court is taking 
Beard too seriously, fashioning a jurisprudence that erroneously 
assumes the Constitution was primarily concerned with protecting 
elite property rights. Adrian Vermeule describes how a more 
uber-Beardian analysis may enlighten judges interested in 
ensuring their opinions are consistent with the dominant forces in 
the contemporary American community. 
Professor Cornell maintains that Beard discredits 
contemporary originalism. An Economic Interpretation 
documented the deep conflicts over constitutional meaning that 
roiled late eighteenth-century constitutional politics. Cornell 
 58. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 59. BEARD, supra note 7, at 9. See also ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1954). 
 60. Charles A. Beard, The Living Constitution, 185 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. 
SCI. 29, 31 (1936). For the progressive commitment to a living constitution, see Howard 
Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the 
“Living Constitution” in the Course of American State-Building, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 
191 (1997).  
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maintains these conflicts are papered over by such contemporary 
originalists as Antonin Scalia. “[O]riginalists,” he charges, “have 
conjured up a false historical past marked by consensus.”61 
Differences between Federalists and anti-Federalists were as 
much over the meaning of the language chosen for the 
constitutional text as over what language should be in the 
constitutional text. Cornell writes, “[t]he meaning of a phrase 
such as ‘the right to bear arms’ meant one thing to Daniel Shays 
and quite another to James Madison.”62 These differences 
extended to interpretive practices. “Should the fully informed 
reasonable reader we construct,” Cornell queries, “use Federalist 
interpretive practices or Anti-Federalist ones?”63 These 
hermeneutical differences doom originalism as a coherent 
interpretive philosophy. “Given the contentious nature of 
Founding era legal culture,” which Beard brought to light, Cornell 
states, “it seems unreasonable to assume that one can identify a 
single set of assumptions and practices from which to construct an 
ideal reasonable reader who could serve as model for how to 
understand the Constitution in 1788.”64 
Professor Case invokes uber-Beard when making a different 
critique of originalism. She thinks the original intention of the 
persons responsible for the Constitution on gender issues is clear, 
but ought to be disregarded as pernicious. Case notes, 
no version of original meaning—not the specific intent of the 
framers, not the general understanding of the ratifiers, not the 
original public meaning, not the original expected application, 
nor any other version of what originalists may say they look to 
in order to determine the scope of constititutional provisions 
holds much promise for yielding what Abigail Adams 
demanded of John—a constitutionally mandated code of laws 
more “generous and favorable” to women than the one the 
framers inherited.65  
Americans ought to abandon any constitutional logic that 
sanctions maintaining eighteenth-century gender practices. 
Interpreting the Constitution in light of the late eighteenth 
century male attitudes toward women, Case declares, perpetuates 
both the democratic injustice that occurred when women were not 
 61. Saul Cornell, Conflict, Consensus & Constitutional Meaning: The Enduring 
Legacy of Charles Beard, 29 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 384 (2014). 
 62. Id. at 385. 
 63. Id. at 404. 
 64. Id. at 405. 
 65. Case, supra note 48, at 445.  
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allowed to participate in the framing and ratification process as 
well as the substantive injustices inherent in framing conceptions 
of gender roles. She states,  
Given the historical exclusion of women from 
decisionmaking . . . in the Republic, . . . [t]o use . . . an 
interpretive methodology like originalism as a brake on 
change . . . leaves out those people who were not able to be part 
of the original process of popular sovereignty and democratic 
decisionmaking.66 
Professor Feldman is concerned with the influence Beard 
may have on contemporary originalists. Beard claimed that the 
Constitution “is an economic document designed to protect the 
interests of the wealthy.”67 This assertion, Feldman insists, is an 
erroneous description of the constitutional politics of 1787. The 
framers were good civic republicans who designed a constitution 
that they thought facilitated the election of public spirited 
representatives who sought the public good.68 Nevertheless, while 
Beard’s “economic depiction of the Constitution does not closely 
fit the framing,” Feldman thinks An Economic Interpretation 
“uncannily fits the Roberts Court’s current interpretation of our 
constitutional order.”69 In his opinion, “the Roberts Court 
interprets the Constitution as if Charles Beard had been 
correct.”70 Leading members of the Roberts Court claim to be 
originalists and Roberts Court majorities are more inclined to 
support business than any previous judicial majority in American 
history.71 This combination of constitutional method and result, 
Feldman argues, serves to make Beard’s interpretation of the 
framing a contemporary reality. “Beard and the conservative 
justices,” he writes, “agree . . . that self-interest politically 
motivates most, if not all, individuals.”72 Ironically, Feldman 
thinks the Roberts Court is actively pursuing the project Beard 
sought to forestall, with Beard’s aid. To refute Beard, therefore, 
is to refute the Roberts Court. As Feldman concludes, “If Beard 
is wrong historically—and he is—then the Roberts Court is 
wrong, too.”73 
 66. Id. at 453. 
 67. Feldman, supra note 34, at 339. 
 68. See supra note 34, and the relevant text. 
 69. Feldman, supra note 34, at 325. 
 70. Id. at 339. 
 71. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares 
in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1431 (2013). 
 72. Feldman, supra note 34, at 345. 
 73. Id. at 344–45.  
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Professor Vermeule suggests that uber-Beardian methods 
may assist some approaches to constitutional decisionmaking, 
while casting doubt on rival logics. Neither originalists nor 
aspirationalists will find attractive a constitution saturated by 
concessions to a particular interest group bent on achieving very 
parochial concerns. “It is not psychologically possible to generate 
large-scale working commitment,” Vermeule notes, “in the 
service of a regime whose genesis is normatively disreputable, and 
known by all to be so.”74 Vermeule suggests, however, that justices 
who adopt a Holmesian perspective on constitutional 
decisionmaking will find uber-Beardian analysis of great value, 
even if the historical Holmes did not. Holmes insisted that justices 
act consistently with the dominant opinion in society.75 He was 
committed to a “least cost principle” that regards “political 
statesmenship” as “choosing the course of action that, at lowest 
possible cost, adjusts constitutional law and policy to match the 
‘actual equilibrium of force in the community – that is, conformity 
to the wishes of the dominant power[].’”76 Uber-Beardian analysis 
provides crucial information for such justices. Beard insisted that, 
as an empirical matter, law reflected the dominant forces in the 
community. Holmes insisted that, as a normative matter, law 
should reflect the dominant forces of the community. Beard’s 
work provides the means for cementing this potential relationship 
between external empirical work and internal normative work. 
“External Beardian scholarship,” Vermeule states, “helps to 
delineate the feasible political options or possibilities for 
constitutional law, a critical datum from the internal but nonideal 
perspective of the Holmesian judge.”77 
IV. IDEAS, INTERESTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
Beard in An Economic Interpretation made two claims about 
ideas and interests. The well known claim, discussed at length in 
many essays below, is that interests better explain the course of 
constitutional development than ideas. The lesser known claim is 
that constitutional commentators should not without compelling 
evidence interpret crucial episodes in American constitutional 
development as the triumph of the people of noble ideas over the 
 74. Adrian Vermeule, Beard & Holmes on Constitutional Adjudication, 29 CONST. 
COMMENT. 457, 460 (2014). 
 75. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 76. Vermeule, supra note 74, at 458. 
 77. Id. at 459.  
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people of shabby interests. Beard’s introduction to the 1935 
edition of An Economic Interpretation sharply criticized those 
who “described the struggle over the formation and adoption of 
the [Constitution] as a contest between sections ending in a 
victory of straight-thinking national-minded men over narrower 
and more local opponents.”78 The central question scholars failed 
to ask was “[h]ow some men got to be ‘national-minded’ and 
‘straight-thinking,’ and others became narrow and local in their 
ideas.”79 Beard was determined to “redress the balance.”80 Beard’s 
economic determinism explains why he emphasized the economic 
interests of both Federalists and anti-Federalists rather than the 
different ideologies of proponents and opponents of the 
Constitution. Nevertheless, An Economic Interpretation was also 
structured by Beard’s commitment to presuming that all parties 
to constitutional conflict are moved by the same kinds of 
concerns. Constitutional politics, in his view, may be a struggle 
between different interests or a contest of different values, but is 
unlikely to be a pitched battle between people motivated by high 
ideals and people out to make a buck. 
The prominent works refuting Beard’s claims that interests 
were the prime movers in the debates over the Constitution 
remained committed to this uber-Beardian notion of balanced 
analysis. The anti-Federalist revival that took place during the 
1950s and 1960s, in particular, illustrates the uber-Beardian 
foundations of ostensibly anti-Beardian work. The most 
prominent of these studies, Cecelia Kenyon’s Men of Little Faith: 
The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of Representative Government, 
claimed that “the ideological context of the Constitution was as 
important in determining its form as were the economic interests 
and motivations of its framers.”81 Kenyon maintained that her 
studies refuted Beard’s economic determinism.82 If, however, one 
focuses on the Beardian insistence on using the same mode of 
analysis for all parties to a controversy, then Kenyon and such 
scholars as Herbert Storing were engaged in uber-Beardian 
 78. Beard, supra note 7, at xliii. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. CECELIA M. KENYON, Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on the Nature of 
Representative Government, in MEN OF LITTLE FAITH: SELECTED WRITINGS OF CECILIA 
KENYON 31, 32 (Stanley Elkins, Eric McKitrick & Leo Weinstein, eds., 2002). The other 
seminal study of anti-Federalist thought is HERBERT J. STORING, THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST (1981). 
 82. See KENYON, supra note 81, at 31; Gordon S. Wood, Foreword to CECILIA M. 
KENYON, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS, at v–vi (1985).  
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projects. Beard leveled the field by interpreting Federalist 
behavior as being as economically motivated as anti-Federalist 
behavior. Kenyon leveled the field by interpreting anti-Federalist 
behavior as being as ideologically motivated as Federalist 
behavior. 
Prominent works in social science retain this uber-Beardian 
bias against interpreting politics as a contest between the party of 
ideas and the party of interests. Proponents of judicial 
behaviorism claim justices across the ideological spectrum vote on 
the basis of their policy preferences rather than on their more 
legal understandings. The most famous sentence in The Supreme 
Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited declares, “[s]imply 
put . . . Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely 
conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he was 
extremely liberal.”83 Proponents of more legal or historical 
institutionalist models of judicial decisionmaking84 insist that 
justices across the ideological spectrum take law seriously when 
making constitutional decisions. Howard Gillman’s analysis of 
judicial behavior at the turn of the twentieth century concluded 
that “the justices were by and large motivated by a principled 
commitment to the application of a constitutional ideology of 
state neutrality.”85 Studies of Supreme Court practice occasionally 
detect an imbalance in voting behavior. Gillman believes most 
justices are motivated by a sincere desire to make good law, but 
he concludes that the majority in Bush v. Gore86 was moved by 
their desire to place George W. Bush in the White House.87 
Nevertheless, Gillman reached this conclusion only after a book 
length analysis that reviewed “carefully the records of th[o]se 
courts and the legal and political justifications offered for their 
decisions.”88 
Too many law professors unfortunately remain mired in an 
anti-Beardian project that contrasts principled judicial 
decisionmaking to judicial decisionmaking based on raw politics. 
Herbert Wechsler’s Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional 
 83. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002).  
 84. MARK A. GRABER, A NEW INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 92–95 (2013). 
 85. HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF 
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 199 (1993). 
 86. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 87. HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED: HOW THE COURT DECIDED 
THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001). 
 88. Id. at 2.  
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Law,89 considered one of the most influential constitutional law 
essays published during the second half of the twentieth century,90 
epitomizes the continued vitality of nineteenth-century 
Manichean understandings of constitutional conflict. Wechsler 
analyzed three lines of cases in which the Supreme Court had 
declared laws unconstitutional.91 These cases concerned judicial 
interpretations of federal powers,92 the first amendment,93 and 
equal protection.94 In all three instances, he concluded that the 
majority opinions striking down the federal or state law in 
question “were strikingly deficient in neutrality.”95 Wechsler 
never discussed either the judicial opinions or commentary that 
favored sustaining the measures under constitutional attack. He 
presumed that justices who deferred to legislative judgments were 
motivated by law, while consistently finding that justices who 
declared laws unconstitutional were engaged in pure politics. 
A century of scholarship in the uber-Beardian tradition 
highlights how the kinds of motivations that help explain the 
behavior of one side to a constitutional conflict typically help 
explain the motivations of the other side to that conflict. If 
Federalists were in part motivated by ideological commitments, 
then research is likely to unveil ideological foundations 
underlying anti-Federalist behavior. If Justice Scalia’s voting 
pattern is partly explained by his conservative policy preferences, 
then research is likely to unveil the liberal policy commitments 
underlying Justice Ginsburg’s votes. Beard’s particular 
conclusions may be wrong, but the last hundred years have 
demonstrated the insights to be gained by scholarship that shares 
his commitment to balanced treatment of the factors that 
motivate political and constitutional behavior. 
 89. 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) 
 90. See Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of 
All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2012). 
 91. Wechsler, supra note 89, at 23–35. 
 92. Id. at 23–24. 
 93. Id. at 24–26. 
 94. Id. at 26–35. 
 95. Id. at 23. See id. at 26 (claiming that recent opinions declaring laws 
unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds lack neutral principles), 29 (claiming that 
opinions declaring that political parties may not discriminate by race lack neutral 
principles), 30 (claiming that opinions declaring unconstitutional judicial enforcement of 
restricting racial covenants lack neutral principles), 32–34 (claiming that opinions declaring 
unconstitutional school segregation lack neutral principles).  
 
